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1 Introduction
Deflationism about truth is the view that truth is not a substantive prop-
erty, e.g. it does not make for genuine similarity. Two truth-bearers (say,
sentences) may be true without being similar or without reflecting any sim-
ilarity in their subject matter or the world. Such is the case with ‘Roses
are red’ and ‘Two succeeds one’: there just doesn’t seem to be much in
common between numbers and the successor relation and roses and redness,
nor between whatever natural relations might hold between these two pairs.
There is, moreover, a certain equivalence (analytic or otherwise) between
asserting, believing, etc. that a sentence is true and asserting, believing,
etc. the sentence itself. This equivalence suggests that truth (or the truth
predicate) plays a merely expressive role and lends further support to defla-
tionism about truth; for any notion employed for mere expressive purposes
seems not to mark out any substantive feature of the world.
An interesting question is whether deflationism about truth (and fal-
sity) extends to related properties and relations on truthbearers. Lionel
Shapiro ([Shapiro, 2011]) answers affirmatively by arguing that a certain
deflationism about truth is as plausible as an analogous version of defla-
tionism about logical consequence. I’ll call this the equi-plausibility thesis.
If correct, logical consequence does not count as a substantive relation and
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instances of valid arguments need not share any substantive property, such
as having a special logical form or necessarily preserving truth (assuming
these properties substantive). The equi-plausibility thesis is striking, for
whereas deflationism about truth is highly compelling, deflationism about
logical consequence seems far less plausible. There is good reason to think
that logically valid arguments do share a substantive property, such as hold-
ing in virtue of the meaning of the logical constants or necessarily preserving
truth in virtue of form alone. The equi-plausibility thesis, then, constitutes
an important claim deserving of careful consideration.
After presenting Shapiro’s arguments for the analogy between a certain
brand of deflationism about truth and about logical consequence, I argue
that the argument fails on two counts. First, it trivializes to any relation
between truthbearers (which I’ll assume for concreteness and neutrality are
sentences), including substantive ones; in other words, his argument can be
used to establish that deflationism about truth is as plausible as deflationism
about an arbitrary sentential relation. Second, the alleged analogy between
the arguments for deflationism about truth and deflationism about conse-
quence fails. Along the way I consider what implications the failure of the
equi-plausibility thesis has for deflationism about falsity.
2 Mere expressive device deflationism
The precise formulation of deflationism that is the target of Shapiro’s ar-
gument he calls mere expressive device deflationism, which I’ll abbreviate
as MEDD.1 MEDD about truth claims that the primary role of the truth
predicate is merely expressive and that the rules which underwrite this ex-
pressive role give us no reason to believe that truth is a substantive property,
so we should not think truth is a substantive property.
The view is inspired by remarks of Quine on the role of the truth predi-
cate, in particular that it allows for the expression (by finite means) of gen-
eralizations over infinitely many sentences.2 For instance, letting φ1, φ2, . . .
be an enumeration of the sentences of Peano arithmetic, one may express
the infinite disjunction of sentences:
• φ1 is true (in the standard model) but not provable in Peano arith-
metic;
• φ2 is true (in the standard model) but not provable in Peano arith-
metic;
• . . .
1Shapiro abbreviates it as ‘MED deflationism’.
2There are, of course, other secondary expressive roles the truth predicate has. E.g.
it allows one to indirectly agree with what someone has uttered, as in ‘Everything Sam
uttered is true’, without knowing precisely what that person has uttered.
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by the sentence
• Not every sentence true (in the standard model) is provable in Peano
arithmetic.
MEDD about truth holds that the expressive role the truth predicate
has is underwritten by a pair of inferential rules that equate each sentence
with the statement that the sentence is true:
p
T-Intro
‘p’ is true
‘p’ is true
T-Elim p
Not enough has been said yet to determine whether the T-rules alone
suffice to underwrite the expressive role of the truth predicate. That role
may require that the truth predicate be transparent in the sense that ‘p’
and the statement that p is true are intersubstitutable salva veritate in ap-
propriate contexts, and this will depend further on the underlying logic.
While taking note of this complication, Shapiro builds into the argument
for MEDD about truth the assumption that the T-rules are sufficient to
underwrite its expressive role. This is not an innocent assumption since it
bears on the plausibility of MEDD about truth and hence on the signifi-
cance of the “equi-plausibility” thesis. For if MEDD about truth turns out
an implausible form of deflationism, the equi-plausibility thesis loses its sig-
nificance. The reason the assumption lacks innocence is that MEDD about
truth is much more plausible when it is assumed that the T-rules alone are
sufficient to underwrite the expressive role of the truth predicate. The need
for any additional rules brings into doubt (T3) (see below) of the argument
for MEDD about truth, so the T-rules alone ought to be enough to give
the truth predicate its primary expressive role. Whether they are in fact
strong enough depends further on how strongly they are interpreted (as e.g.
analytic or strict implications), an issue which resurfaces in §4.
The arguments for MEDD about truth and consequence
Now that we have seen the underlying motivation for MEDD about truth,
we come to Shapiro’s formulation of an argument for the thesis, which I
reproduce in full.
T1. If it were not for the need to express a certain kind of generality, we
would have no need for the predicate ‘is true’. Instead of predicating
‘is true’ of a sentence, we could employ the sentence itself.
T2. To explain how ‘is true’ allows us to express the kind of generality in
question, we need only make use of the predicate’s logical features,
namely, the T-rules.
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T3. There is no reason to think that the T-rules require ‘is true’ to express
a property whose nature is amenable to substantive characterization.
T4. From (T1), (T2) and (T3), it follows that there is no reason to think
that in order to understand how ‘is true’ serves the function that is its
raison d’eˆtre, we must take this predicate to express a property whose
nature is amenable to substantive characterization.
T5. Hence we have no reason to hold that ‘is true’ expresses a property
whose nature is amenable to substantive characterization.
Premise (T3) needs to be flagged as an important but mysterious premise.
For it is not clear what it would take for a pair of inferential rules to give
us reason to think that a property they refer to is substantive. Similarly,
exactly what features of the T-rules give us no reason to think that the
truth predicate picks out a substantive property? Is it that they seem to
allow truth to be explained away? This cannot be so, since it is important
that MEDD about truth not entail the claim that truth can be explained
away. If the entailment went through, as we will see, it would show that
MEDD about truth and consequence are not analogous after all. For the
rules which underwrite the main role of the consequence predicate certainly
do not lead us to think that consequence can be explained away. It is not
clear then what it is about the T-rules that justify (T3) nor whether these
features are had by the C-rules (below) which underwrite the expressive role
of the consequence predicate. If the C-rules lack these features, the analogy
between the arguments for MEDD about truth and about consequence fails.
It is crucial for MEDD about truth that the T-rules be read in such
a way that they at least preserve truth rather than, say, mere warranted
assertibility (or weaker properties in the vicinity) for the following reason.
It is possible that we use sentences to convey, not the truth of what they
express, but rather the falsity of what they express. We might also use
sentences to convey that what they express is true on a certain hypothesis.
Indeed, we could use them any way we like and it is a contingent fact about
us as language users that we typically use sentences to convey their truth.
Now suppose a linguistic community, say the Samsons, used sentences in
such a way that a sincere utterance of ‘p’ conveyed that p is believed by
some person, Sam.3 Then the main role of the predicate ‘is believed by Sam’
would (for the Samsons) be merely expressive in the sense that an utterance
of ‘ ‘p’ is believed by Sam’ would convey precisely the same thing as an
utterance of ‘p’. This equivalence would be underwritten by the following
rules structurally identical to the T-rules:
3The sentential variable here is to be filled with a sentence, such as ‘Snow is white’,
rather than a name of the sentence. This explains why it occurs in quotes in the first
instance.
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p
Sam-Intro
‘p’ is believed by Sam
‘p’ is believed by Sam
Sam-Elim p
But importantly, the Sam-rules do not preserve truth. Rather they pre-
serve some notion of being correct to utter: if it is correct for a Samson
to utter ‘p’ then it is correct for her to utter ‘ ‘p’ is believed by Sam’, and
conversely. This crucial disanalogy between the T-rules and the Sam-rules
prevents the Samsons from running an argument for MEDD about the prop-
erty of being believed by Sam (which invokes the Sam-rules) that is parallel
to the one for MEDD about truth.
By now, one may have anticipated how the argument for MEDD about
logical consequence runs. It essentially replaces the T-rules in the argument
for MEDD about truth by the following C-rules, making obvious changes
elsewhere:
That p entails that q
C-Intro.
‘p’ has ‘q’ as consequence
‘p’ has ‘q’ as consequence
C-Elim.
That p entails that q
These rules are assumed to underwrite the expressive role of the consequence
predicate. Here is the argument for MEDD about consequence in full.
C1. If it were not for the need to express a certain kind of generality, we
would have no need for the predicate ‘is a consequence of’. In place of
‘s2 is a logical consequence of s1’, we could employ sentences s1 and
s2 themselves, joined by a suitable sentential connective.
C2. To explain how ‘is a consequence of’ allows us to express the kind of
generality in question, we need only make use of the predicate’s logical
features, namely, the C-rules.
C3. There is no reason to think that the C-rules require ‘is a consequence
of’ to express a property whose nature is amenable to substantive
characterization.
C4. From (C1), (C2) and (C3), it follows that there is no reason to think
that in order to understand how ‘is a consequence of’ serves the func-
tion that is its raison d’eˆtre, we must take this predicate to express a
property whose nature is amenable to substantive characterization.
C5. Hence we have no reason to hold that ‘is a consequence of’ expresses a
property whose nature is amenable to substantive characterization.
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Note that the unwritten assumption that the main role of the conse-
quence predicate is merely expressive is much more contentious than it is
for the truth predicate. Locutions of the form ‘ ‘q’ follows from ‘p’ ’ are much
more natural than those of the form ‘That p entails that q’ which suggests
that the connective- rather than predicate-involving locutions play a merely
expressive role. The same is not true for truth: an utterance of p is almost
always more natural than an utterance of ‘ ‘p’ is true’, suggesting that the
latter are only used in special circumstances, e.g. in making generalizations.
This already marks a disanalogy between (the arguments for) MEDD about
truth and consequence, but those discussed in §4 are far more worrying for
the equi-plausibility thesis.
3 Trivializing the equi-plausibility thesis
Consider the following rules:
It is believed by Jan that p
Jan-Intro.
‘p’ is believed by Jan
‘p’ is believed by Jan
Jan-Elim.
It is believed by Jan that p
The Jan-rules necessarily preserve truth (unlike the Sam-rules, recall).
Moreover, they have the same form as the C-rules: the predicate-involving
statement is interchangeable with the connective-involving statement. Mak-
ing suitable changes in the argument for MEDD about consequence, do we
obtain an analogous argument for MEDD about the sentential—and clearly
substantive—property of being believed by Jan? Not quite. One key premise
of MEDD about consequence is that the primary role of the consequence
predicate is expressive. The premise may be objectionable, but certainly
not to the extent that its analog for MEDD about being believed by Jan
is—there just is no reason to think that the primary role of ‘is believed by
Jan’ is expressive. So there is yet no completely analogous argument for
MEDD about being believed by Jan, at last not one involving the Jan-rules.
However, suppose we introduce a predicate which is by stipulation both
extensionally identical to ‘is believed by Jan’ and whose primary role is ex-
pressive; call it ‘is Janned’. We may, moreover, stipulate that its expressive
role is underwritten by the following pair of rules:
It is believed by Jan that p
Janned-Intro
‘p’ is Janned
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‘p’ is Janned
Janned-Elim
It is believed by Jan that p
There is now an argument for MEDD about being believed by Jan which
completely parallels the one for MEDD about consequence. We have a
predicate, ‘is Janned’ whose primary role is expressive and underwritten by
a pair of truth-preserving rules that provide just as much reason as the C-
rules (i.e. none, according to the argument) for thinking that the property
they involve is substantive.
Indeed, we may rerun a parallel strategy for any sentential relation for
which we can introduce a corresponding predicate. In other words, the equi-
plausibility thesis trivializes. Since some sentential relations are substantive,
either the analogy between MEDD about truth and other relations fails or
there is already something wrong with MEDD about truth itself. Since
MEDD seems a plausible deflationist position, the problem is likely to be
located in the analogy.
Trivializing MEDD will require in certain cases introducing both a pred-
icate and a corresponding sentential connective used in formulating the rules
which underwrite the expressive role of the predicate. In the case of Jan’s
beliefs, we needed only to introduce a predicate whose primary role—it was
stipulated—is expressive and, moreover, underwritten by the Janned-rules.
The corresponding sentential connective, ‘it is believed by Jan that’ already
exists in English, so we did not need to introduce it alongside ‘is Janned’.
In general, let R be any n-place sentential relation. Then the following
three claims, which are enough to show that the equi-plausibility thesis
trivializes, are all highly plausible:
1. we can introduce an n-place predicate ‘s1, . . . , sn stand in R’ denot-
ing R and a corresponding n-place sentential connective R(s1, . . . , sn)
expressing that s1, . . . , sn stand in R;
2. the primary role of ‘s1, . . . , sn stand in R’ is (perhaps by stipulation)
expressive;
3. the expressive role of ‘s1, . . . , sn stand in R’ is (perhaps by stipulation)
underwritten by the pair of rules:
R(s1, . . . , sn)
R-Intro
‘s1, . . . , sn stand in R’
‘s1, . . . , sn stand in R’
R-Elim R(s1, . . . , sn)
An equi-plausibility claim concerning MEDD about truth and R follows
straightforwardly.
How might an MEDD deflationist respond to this trivializing argument?
First, they might demand that ‘suitable sentential connective’, as it occurs
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in premise (C1), requires that the connective already exist in natural lan-
guage. There are two problems with this response. One is that it appears
to block the argument for MEDD about consequence itself since likely there
is no connective ‘entails’ in any natural language, let alone English, that ex-
actly corresponds with any philosopher’s sense of logical entailment. Two,
while the response blocks MEDD from trivializing, it does not block the
equi-plausibility of MEDD about being believed by Jan and MEDD about
consequence and truth since ‘is believed by Jan that’ already exists in natu-
ral language. So while this response blocks the equi-plausibility thesis from
trivializing, we still have the equi-plausibility of MEDD about a deflationary-
looking notion like truth with MEDD about a substantive notion like being
believed by Jan which is bad enough to undermine Shapiro’s argument.
Second, one might respond to the trivializing argument by claiming that
only properties expressible by predicates characterizable by inferential rules
are admissible in MEDD arguments. For the fact that the expressive role of
the truth (and consequence) predicate is claimed to be underwritten by such
rules is essential to the argument for MEDD about truth (and consequence).
The thought would be that MEDD about such properites look equally plau-
sible because these notions, being characterizable by inferential rules, appear
to be (broadly) logical and deflatable. (Indeed, most deflationists think of
truth as logical.)
Consider the property being believed by Jan. It doesn’t appear to be
characterizable by inferential rules in the sense that there is a predicate
expressing the property that is characterized by inferential rules. But indeed
it is: it is characterized, among many others, by the Jan- and Janned-rules!
Indeed, for any sentential relation for which we introduce (by stipulation,
say) a predicate and a corresponding connective, we get rules characterizing
the relation for free.
One might deny that such rules need not genuinely characterize a senten-
tial relation. The problem now is that whatever genuine characterizability
amounts to, I do not see how it can rule out being believed by Jan as being
characterized by the Jan- or Janned-rules without also ruling out logical
consequence (and perhaps truth even) from being ruled out as being char-
acterized by the C-rules (T-rules in the case of truth). The rules are exactly
analogous, equating statements involving a sentential operator with corre-
sponding statements involving a sentential predicate.
Moreover, if logical consequence is not ruled out on the grounds of being
an inferentialist-friendly logical notion, then it looks like the sort of defla-
tionism involved no longer has anything to do with mere expressive device
deflationism. Rather, the deflationist position now appears to be that con-
sequence is deflatable in virtue of being an inferentialist-friendly logical no-
tion. So maintaining that only inferentialist-friendly notions yield plausible
MEDD arguments cannot save the equi-plausibility thesis from trivializing.
4 THE DISANALOGY BETWEEN TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCE 9
The upshot is that MEDD about any sentential relation is as plausible
about MEDD about consequence. For any sentential relation we can in-
troduce a predicate and corresponding sentential connective expressing the
relation such that the main role of the predicate is both expressive and
underwritten by a pair of rules completely parallel to the C-rules. Since
there are substantive and non-substantive sentential relations, there must
be something wrong with the argument from MEDD about consequence. It
simply isn’t true that all sentential relations are equally plausibly deflatable.
The problem with the argument, I shall now argue, is that the analogy fails.
4 The disanalogy between truth and consequence
There are two crucial points of disanology in the arguments for MEDD
about truth and consequence: the first concerns the third premises (T3)
and (C3) and the second the T- and C-rules. Recall that (T3) claims that
the T-rules give us no reason to think that the truth predicate picks out a
substantive property. What justifies this premise? One thought is that the
T-rules allow the elimination of all traces of reference to truth (in suitable
contexts, e.g. not in generalizations, self-reference and indirect agreement).
Clearly the C-rules do not allow the elimination of reference to logical con-
sequence in similarly suitable contexts since they allow only the swapping of
the consequence predicate with the entailment connective, where each refers
in different ways to logical consequence. Recall, however, that this point
about eliminability does not mark out a relevant disanalogy according to
Shapiro because, unlike certain other brands of deflationism, it is not part
of MEDD about consequence or truth that consequence or truth be in any
sense eliminable.4
Yet there is something less plausible about (C3) when compared with
(T3). What is it about the C-rules that gives us no reason to think that
the consequence predicate picks out a substantive property? It cannot be
anything about the eliminability of the notion of logical consequence, since
there is no such eliminability. And it cannot be the mere fact that the C-
rules underwrite the expressive role of the consequence predicate, for then
the Janned-rules would equally give us no reason to think that ‘is Janned’
picks out a substantive property. Indeed, there isn’t much reason to think
(C3) is true, not even if one holds MEDD about truth. On the other hand
(T3) has independent plausibility from the fact e.g. that the T-rules permit
the eliminability of reference to truth (in suitable contexts) even if that
eliminability is not supposed to be part and parcel of MEDD about truth.
4The primarily expressive function of the truth predicate implies that reference to
truth, outside of certain expressive purposes, is eliminable. When the truth predicate
isn’t playing its expressive role, reference to truth will be eliminable. In an important
sense, then, the eliminability of reference to truth is part of MEDD about truth.
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Why else would (T3) be plausible? (Recall that if (T3) isn’t plausible,
neither is MEDD about truth, and thus the equi-plausibility thesis loses any
import.)
The second point of disanalogy concerns the interpretation of the C-rules.
It is crucial to the argument for MEDD about consequence that the C-rules
be read so that in each the conclusion logically follows from the premise. If
they are read as anything weaker than strict implications they will fail to
secure transparency in the contexts required for the expressive role of the
consequence predicate to be underwritten by them (i.e. the C-rules). In fact,
transparency may even require that they be read as strictly stronger than
strict implications—indeed, as logical entailments.
There are still other reasons (besides those concerning transparency) that
suggest the C-rules need to be read as logical entailments. For if they are
read so that the premise merely strictly implies the conclusion, the failure
of the rules to preserve truth in all logically possible circumstances brings
(C3) into doubt. The fact that the rules do not apply generally suggests that
there is a substantive feature of logical consequence that explains precisely
the cases under which the C-rules fail and those under which they hold.
Why else would the rules necessarily—in the merely alethic rather than
logical sense—preserve truth? It is not clear any answer could be given
without positing consequence to be a substantive property. It follows that
the plausibility of the argument for MEDD about consequence requires that
the C-rules be taken as logical entailments.
But this need to read the C-rules as logical entailments introduces a cir-
cularity into the argument for MEDD about consequence that is not present
in the case of truth. The circularity is this. The C-rules are to suggest that
the consequence predicate picks out no substantive property. However, this
is only plausible if the rules themselves do not essentially invoke the very
relation they suggest is not a substantive property. Shapiro may not think
eliminability is part of MEDD, but if (contra Shapiro) it must be (because
the plausibility of third premises of MEDD arguments hinges on it) then
there is a sense in which reference to consequence can never be eliminated
in the argument for MEDD about consequence—for the C-rules themselves
must be regarded as logical entailments.
Notice that some of these considerations apply equally to MEDD about
truth: the T-rules must too be regarded as logical entailments lest the
T-rules fail to secure full transparency. The difference in this case, how-
ever, is that there is no threat of circularity since entailment needn’t be
thought of in terms of truth preservation. Entailment can be spelled out in
terms quite independently of any talk of preservation of truth, even if such
spelling out implies that entailment necessarily preserve truth. The fact
that the T-rules must be taken as logical entailments in the argument for
MEDD about truth brings out an important difference between MEDD and
other forms of deflationism which do not require the T-rules (or the corre-
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sponding T-schema) to be read in such a way. Other forms of deflationism
may read the T-schema as something other than logical equivalences, such
as “cognitive equivalence” and strict implication (see e.g. [Field, 1994] and
[Horwich, 1998] respectively), since they do not require that the expressive
role of truth be underwritten by the T-rules alone.
5 MEDD about falsity
Deflationists about truth are typically also deflationists about falsity. In
particular, MEDD about falsity claims that the expressive role of falsity is
underwritten by the following rules:
not-p
F-Intro
‘p’ is false
‘p’ is false
F-Elim not-p
The F- and C-rules look exactly analogous, and this gives Shapiro a de-
fense against certain objections to the equi-plausibility thesis. Any objec-
tion against the equi-plausibility thesis that is equally an objection against
the similar, and let us assume correct, thesis concerning MEDD about truth
and falsity can’t be a good objection, the defense goes, at least not by the
deflationists own lights. Here is one such objection that Shapiro considers
to which he uses this defense. The conclusion of the argument for MEDD
about consequence cannot be right since the C-rules make essential use of
an entailment connective whose nature is open to “substantive enquiry”
[Shapiro, 2011, p. 328]. Shapiro responds to this objection by noting that
the same is true concerning MEDD about falsity: the argument makes es-
sential use of a negation connective whose nature is also open to substantive
enquiry. Thus, Shapiro concludes, the objection is not convincing, assuming
that MEDD about truth and falsity are on equal footing.
I agree that the objection is unconvincing but not because it equally un-
dermines the correct thesis that MEDD about truth and falsity stand and
fall together. It fails because whatever “substantive enquiry” or substantive
theorizing amounts to, the fact that a property is open to substantive enquiry
need not entail that the property is substantive. Surely people can substan-
tively theorize about non-substantive properties. There is, nonetheless, an
important disanalogy between the arguments for MEDD about falsity and
consequence such that arguments put against the latter do not necessary
carry over, mutatis mutandis, to the former. The disanalogy is this.
Given the usual definition of falsity as truth of negation, viz. ‘ ‘p’ is false’
iff ‘ ‘not-p’ is true’ (where ‘iff’ is understood as definitional equivalence), the
F-rules are merely special cases of the corresponding T-rules. The F-rules
are simply rewritings of the following rules:
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not-p
F-Intro
‘not-p’ is true
‘not-p’ is true
F-Elim not-p
If we interpret them as universally quantifying over all their instances, the
F-rules are logically equivalent to the T-rules.5 It is no wonder, then, that
deflationism (including MEDD) about truth and falsity stand or fall to-
gether.
The C-rules, however, are neither special cases of, nor are they logically
equivalent to, the T-rules. Suppose, like falsity, we define logical consequence
in terms of truth of entailment, so that ‘p’ has ‘q’ as consequence iff ‘that
p entails that q’ is true. Then the question is whether the C-rules are, on
this definition, special cases of the T-rules, suggesting—just as in the case
of falsity—that truth is deflatable if and only if consequence is. It is not
difficult to see, however, that the C-rules are not special cases of the T-rules:
the consequence predicate is binary whereas the truth predicate is not.
Conversely, there is equally no hope of setting things up so that the T-
rules turn out to be special cases of the C-rules. For that to be the case
we would need to find a sentence ‘q’ involving only ‘p’, the consequence
predicate and the entailment connective which implies ‘ ‘p’ is true’. But
what sentence could ‘q’ be? It cannot be the obvious candidate, ‘ ‘not-p’
has p as consequence’, for truth need not be logical truth. It can be true
that ‘ ‘p’ is true’ (e.g. ‘ ‘Snow is white’ is true’) without it being true that
‘ ‘not-p’ has p as logical consequence’, i.e. that p is a logical truth. There
is therefore no reason to think that the arguments for MEDD about falsity
and consequence are as similar as it might at first seem. The F-rules may
appear to be exactly analogous to the C-rules but appearances here are
entirely misleading.
6 Conclusion
While I think the equi-plausibility thesis does not in the end succeed and
that on many popular conceptions of consequence the relation is indeed a
substantive one, there is at least one conception of consequence that could
be viewed in a deflationary spirit. That conception takes logical conse-
quence to be the smallest relation which necessarily preserves truth from
premises to conclusion, where both necessity and truth are understood in
deflationary terms. A Lewisian view of necessity, for instance, might qual-
ify as deflationary since on that view necessary truths need not mark out
5This assumes a certain feature of the underlying logic, viz. that every sentence is
logically equivalent to a negation. If this is contentious, the stronger point about logical
equivalence (versus being a special case of the T-rules) is only meant for emphasis. It is
certainly not essential to the point at hand.
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any metaphysically natural property.6 But I doubt such a conception of
consequence qualifies as logical—i.e. I doubt strict implication and logical
entailment exactly coincide. Consequence has a formality aspect that strict
implication lacks. Shapiro has nonetheless given us reason to explore notions
besides truth and falsity that may just fit the deflationary mold.
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